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Abstract In this study, we consider the role of a publicly owned platform and
programme quality in the free-to-air broadcasting industry. We compare the equi-
librium levels of advertising under private and mixed duopoly competition, and show
that the connection between programme quality and advertising incentives is dras-
tically different in each scenario. We also consider the welfare implications of our
analysis and generate policy implications regarding the optimal level of government
intervention in the broadcasting industry.
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1 Introduction
This study addresses the role of public intervention in the free-to-air broadcasting
industry. In fact, public intervention in broadcasting markets has been particularly
justified when advertising is the only method of commercial provision. As suggested
by Coase (1966), in the absence of subscription television, public policy can increase
social welfare by improving the quality and diversity of the available programming.
A basic ingredient of the justification of this public regulation is usually associated
with the need of diminishing the nuisance of excessive advertising. The rapid tech-
nological advances in the broadcasting and communication industries have enhanced
the debate on the role of public intervention in broadcasting industries (see, among
others, Armstrong 2005). Moreover, this debate has become particularly relevant as a
result of recent controversial policy decisions within the EU. Particularly remarkable
is the decision by the public TV platform in France (followed more recently by its
counterpart in Spain) to eliminate advertising as a method of financing.1
In this study, we consider the role of programme quality and a publicly owned plat-
form in the context of the free-to-air broadcasting industry. Publicly owned platforms
are prominent in the broadcasting media industry in many Western countries. The
empirical relevance of this presence is observed in Bel and Domènech (2009) (table
1 p. 167), and more recently, in Sanz (2012). In particular, we note the existence of
one or more national publicly owned TV platforms in Italy, Germany, France, UK,
Switzerland and Spain.
Despite the above-mentioned evidence, there is a surprising lack of research into
the role of publicly owned platforms in themedia industry and its connection to the use
of advertising. A remarkable exception is the work by Kind et al. (2007). As noted by
those authors, consideration of the role of publicly owned TV as a method of broad-
casting market regulation is natural, in view of the problems associated with alter-
native regulation policies. In particular, lobbying pressures, technological progress
and increased globalisation appear to have increased the difficulty of the optimal
implementation of the direct regulation of advertising time in private platforms. In a
model including horizontal product differentiation, these authors show that a welfare-
maximising publicly owned TV channel generates less advertising than private ones
if and only if the degree of the TV platforms’ horizontal differentiation is sufficiently
large. The intuition of their results is that if the broadcasting products are very close
substitutes, then audiences will be very sensitive to advertising, and as a consequence,
private advertising incentives will be too small from the social welfare perspective.
A mixed duopoly incorporating advertising regulation in the broadcasting industry
is considered by Stühmeier and Wenzel (2012) in the context of a Hotelling model
including horizontal differentiation. They evaluate the effects of a binding advertising
cap on competition for viewers and advertisers in a duopoly framework. They find that
the regulation of advertising can increase profits. This result is explained by competing
1 In substitution for this source of financing, the French government has established a tax on the revenues
earned by private TV and telecom platforms, a decision that is currently under investigation by the European
Commission.
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channels’ failure to completely account for the effect that their choice has on rivals’
advertising prices, which is resolved through exogenous regulation.
With their empirical approach, Alcock and Docwra (2005) develop a stochastic
oligopoly model calibrated for the Australian broadcast TV market. They find that the
presence of a public platform can generate positive outcomes for viewers and other
market suppliers simultaneously because it increases viewers’ choice and total market
size. More recently, Bel and Domènech (2009) have undertaken an empirical analy-
sis in the Spanish broadcasting industry and found that advertisers create a negative
externality to viewers that tends to be mitigated by the presence of publicly owned
platforms.
The analysis of advertising in broadcasting media industries with private platforms
has been considered extensively in the recent literature.2 In particular, Gabszewicz et
al. (2004) consider two private TV-platforms that derive their profits from advertising
and show that the platforms’ profiles become closer as advertising aversion becomes
stronger. Anderson and Coate (2005) show that advertising levels may be too low or
too high with respect to the socially optimal level, depending on the nuisance cost
to viewers, the substitutability of programmes and the expected benefits enjoyed by
advertisers as a result of contacting viewers.
The role of advertising quality is considered by Gantman and Shy (2007). Those
authors assume two types of viewers: those whose utility increases in the number of
broadcasted advertisements and, those whose utility is unaffected by the number of
advertisements they are exposed to. They show that if the improvement of advertising
quality is profitable for the advertising firms, it is unprofitable for TV platforms.
Peitz and Valletti (2008) analyse the comparisons between the pay-TV setting, in
which platforms obtain revenue from advertising and from viewers, and the free-to-
air setting, in which platforms obtain all revenues from advertising. They show that
if viewers strongly dislike advertising, advertising intensity is greater in a free-to-air
setting and that free-to-air platforms tend to provide less differentiated content. In
contrast, pay-TV platforms always maximally differentiate their content.
Crampes et al. (2009) consider the effects of advertising on entry into the media
industry. They show that under constant or increasing returns to scale in the audience,
the entry level is excessive and the advertising level is insufficient.
Most of these previous contributions focus on the combination of advertising and
horizontal product differentiation among private platforms in two-sided markets. In
contrast to these previous contributions, our model considers two relevant aspects of
the broadcasting industry simultaneously:
First, in addition to horizontal differentiation, we also assume the presence of differ-
ences in programme quality, measured in terms of viewers’ utility. In the previous liter-
ature, onlyArmstrong (2005), Crampes et al. (2009), and Lin (2011) analyse the role of
program quality in the broadcasting industry. In particular, Armstrong (2005) and Lin
(2011) compare the equilibrium quality levels associated with the free-to-air duopoly
regime and subscription, whereas Crampes et al. (2009) analyse the effects of endoge-
nous quality improvements on entry. However, these previous contributions assume
2 See the interesting surveys by Anderson (2007) and Anderson and Gabszewicz (2006) on advertising in
the media.
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the existence of competition among symmetric private platforms, whereas we consider
the role of a publicly owned platform in the presence of asymmetric quality levels.3
Second, our model analyses the combined role of publicly owned television and
advertising in the broadcasting markets. As explained above, only Kind et al. (2007)
have analysed this issue from a theoretical perspective. However, in contrast to this
previous contribution, which is focused on a model of a representative consumer
and horizontal differentiation, our approach combines both horizontal and vertical
differentiation among platforms in the context of a linearHotellingmodel. Specifically,
the aim of our paper is twofold:
1) We first analyse the optimal advertising decision of the public platform, consid-
ering two welfare effects: (i) a direct effect, measured in terms of advertising revenues
and nuisance costs, and (ii) an indirect effect, which works through the distribution
of the audience among the broadcasting platforms. As we will show, this indirect
effect depends on both the degree of product differentiation and the quality differen-
tial between platforms. Interestingly, as in the model created by Kind et al. (2007), in
our model, the equilibrium level of advertising by the publicly owned platform can
be positive even if advertising has a direct socially harmful effect. However, whereas
these authors focus on the effects exerted by the degree of horizontal product differ-
entiation on the advertising comparisons between the private platform and publicly
owned platform, our model considers the role of both horizontal and vertical (quality)
differentiation explicitly. We show that the quality differential between the platforms
is crucial in optimal advertising choice on the part of the public platform. In particular,
we find that the greater the public platforms’ quality differential and the higher the rela-
tive harmful effect of advertising, the more likely it is that an “advertising-free” public
platform is optimal. Intuitively, by decreasing its advertising, the publicly owned plat-
form increases its audience, which is socially beneficial if its quality differential is
large. These results show that the explicit consideration of the quality differential in
our model provides new insights with respect to the previous models, such as Kind et
al. (2007), that have focused on only the role of horizontal differentiation.4
2) Second, we compare the equilibrium levels of advertising in two settings: a pri-
vate duopoly, which includes two private profit-maximising platforms, and a mixed
duopoly, in which a welfare-maximising publicly owned platform competes with a
private platform.5 We identify the conditions under which privatisation is socially
desirable and show that the connection between programme quality and advertising
3 Lin (2011) also considers a third regime in which a pay-TV broadcaster competes with one free-TV
broadcaster.
4 Therefore, whereas Kind et al. (2007) focus on the interplay between the degree of horizontal differenti-
ation and the number of competitors, to explain the advertising policy of the publicly owned platform, our
model focuses on the combined role of horizontal differentiation and quality differentials.
5 Few papers consider the existence of a public-owned firm in a model of horizontal product differentiation.
Kumar and Saha (2008) show that unless public ownership exceeds a critical level, maximal differentiation
continues to hold and social welfare does not improve with public ownership. Moreover, Sanjo (2009)
analyses price choice and sequential price choice simultaneously and shows how the degree of a publicly
owned firm’s privatization influences social welfare in a mixed duopoly market. Finally, Martínez-Sánchez
(2011) uses the model developed by Sanjo and shows that in the location game, in which firms set prices
simultaneously, social welfare depends on the degree of privatisation and is only maximised if the partially
privatised firm is a fully publicly owned firm.
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incentives differ drastically between the two scenarios. In particular, we show that the
presence of a public platform is socially desirable if its quality differential is positive
and advertising is harmful or if its quality differential is negative and advertising is
beneficial. However, it is also shown that there are conditions under which privatisa-
tion is socially better than a mixed duopoly. Intuitively, privatisation might act as a
commitment device that allows the government to improve the welfare level through
its effect on the response of the rival platform.
The main insight provided by our analysis is that the interplay between the social
cost of advertising and the quality differential between platforms is crucial in the
assessment of both the equilibrium level of advertising and the social desirability of a
publicly owned platform.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: Sect. 2 presents a spatial duopoly
market with private platforms, Sect. 3 analyses the model with a mixed duopoly in
which one of the competitors is a publicly owned firm that maximises welfare, Sect. 4
considers advertising and welfare comparisons of the two models, and Sect. 5 con-
cludes.
2 The private duopoly model
We will assume two private platforms, each located at one extreme of a linear market
of length 1. There is a mass of consumers of measure 1, distributed uniformly along
this linear market. Each consumer, indexed by x ∈ [0, 1], chooses either one unit of
good or zero. The utility of consumer x if she/he watches platform i = 1, 2 is provided
by the function
u(vi , ai , x) =
{
v1 − δa1 − t x if i = 1,
v2 − δa2 − t (1 − x) if i = 2,
where vi is the gross utility from the chosen platform, δ is the parameter representing
the disutility or nuisance cost per unit of advertising (denoted by ai ),6 and t is the
transport cost per unit of the distance of departure from his/her favourite TV program.
Moreover, t can be interpreted as the degree of substitutability, so a higher t indicates
that platforms are less substitutable.
Let us define x1 as the marginal consumer who is indifferent between watch-
ing/listening to platform 1 or platform 2. Thus, x1 is provided by the following con-
dition:
v1 − δa1 − t x1 = v2 − δa2 − t (1 − x1).
In addition, we define x2 = 1 − x1. Thus, we can obtain the demand for firm i ,
which is as follows:
6 Assuming δ > 0 is consistent with the empirical evidence provided by Wilbur (2008). This author finds
that viewers dislike advertising in the TV industry.
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xi (ai , a j ) = vi − v j + t − δ(ai − a j )
2t
, i = 1, 2, j = i. (1)
As in Gabszewicz et al. (2004), we consider the advertising market to be per-
fectly competitive, so advertisers’ profits are zero. However, we assume that the profit
obtained by each platform consists of the advertising revenue, so this is provided by
πi = γ ai xi , where γ can be interpreted as the revenue per ad per viewer, which in
turn, is assumed to be proportional to advertising level.7 By substituting the demand
function (1) in the definition of profits, we can obtain the following:
πi (ai , a j ) = γ ai vi − v j + t − δ(ai − a j )
2t
, i = 1, 2, j = i. (2)
Let z ≡ (v1 − v2)/t be the (relative) quality differential between both platforms;
thus, a higher z could be the result of a higher quality differential or a higher degree of
substitution between platforms. Let k ≡ γ /δ be the relative value between the revenue
per ad per viewer and the nuisance cost. Note that γ is the social value of advertising,
whereas δ is its social cost. Therefore, from the social welfare perspective, the direct
effect of advertising is neutral if k = 1, beneficial if k > 1, and harmful if k < 1. Let
us investigate the Nash equilibrium (NE) in advertising levels. To guarantee that NE
levels of market shares are positive for both platforms, we assume that z ∈ (−3, 3) in
the remainder of this section. Using the first order conditions of profit maximisation,
we can obtain the reaction function of each firm:
aB Ri (a j ) =
vi − v j + t
2δ
+ a j
2
, i = 1, 2, i = j, (3)
which yields the following NE levels of advertising, market shares and profits:
a∗i =
vi − v j + 3t
3δ
; a∗ = a∗1 + a∗2 =
2t
δ
;
x∗i =
vi − v j + 3t
6t
; π∗i =
k(vi − v j + 3t)2
18t
. (4)
Considering (4), it is clear that platforms implement more advertising and obtain a
larger audience when their quality is higher. They thus increase their profits because
higher quality allows for the softening of advertising competition because advertising
level plays the same role as price in the well-known Hotelling model, as demonstrated
by Gabszewicz et al. (2004). Proposition 1 summarises these results.
Proposition 1 In the case of competition among private platforms, the following prop-
erties hold at the NE of the game:
i) The advertising levels, market share and profit of platform i increase with its own
quality and decrease with the quality of its rival.
ii) Total advertising level is independent of quality levels.
7 In particular, we assume that platforms do not compete for advertisers. This assumption is common in
the literature on two-sided markets and is known as competitive bottleneck (Armstrong 2006).
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Proof See Appendix. unionsq
In addition, (4) indicates that the following result holds:
Proposition 2 In the case of competition among private platforms, each platform’s
profit decreases with the degree of substitutability among platforms, increases with
the revenue per ad per viewer and decreases with the nuisance cost of ads.
Proof See Appendix. unionsq
According to Proposition 2, lower substitutability among platforms implies that
these platforms earn a higher profit because competition in ads is softened when
platforms are less substitutable and the market is fully covered. In contrast, we find
that a higher nuisance cost implies lower profits as a result of viewers’ incentives to
switch being higher with a high nuisance cost because the utility that viewers obtain
from watching a TV-platform decreases with the nuisance cost.8
Consumer surplus (C S) is calculated as follows:9
CS = v1x1 − δa1x1 − t
x1∫
0
xdx + v2(1 − x1) − δa2(1 − x1) − t
1∫
x1
(1 − x)dx . (5)
We now calculate social welfare (W ), which is defined as the sum of platforms’
profits (π = π1 + π2 = γ a1x1 + γ a2(1 − x1)) and consumer surplus
W =π + CS = (γ − δ)a2 + (v1 − v2 + t + (γ − δ)(a1 − a2))x1 − t x21 + v2 −
t
2
.
(6)
Considering the equilibriumvalue of advertising andmarket share by each platform,
and using z ≡ (v1 − v2)/t , and k ≡ γ /δ, we obtain the social welfare for when both
platforms are private, which is as follows:
W ∗ = t 9(4k − 3) + 18z + (4k + 1)z
2
36t
+ v2 − t
2
(7)
Because k ≡ γ /δ, social welfare increases with the revenue per ad per viewer γ
and decreases with nuisance cost, δ because platforms’ profits depend positively on
γ and negatively on δ, whereas consumer surplus is independent of γ but depends
negatively on δ.
To facilitate understanding of subsequent welfare comparisons, let us analyse the
welfare distortions present in the private duopoly. In particular, (6) makes it easy to
observe that if k ≡ γ /δ < 1 (advertising is harmful), a social planner that maximises
welfare with respect to a1 and a2 would choose zero advertising levels, which in turn,
8 These results coincide with those obtained by Peitz and Valletti (2008).
9 Recall that x2 = 1 − x1.
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yields the first-best level for the market share of firm 1, which is provided by xo1 =
v1−v2+t
2t = z+12 . Therefore, there are two types of distortions in the private duopoly:
first, what we might call the “advertising distortion effect”, arising from the presence
of harmful advertising (a∗i > a
o
i = 0), and second, the “audience distortion effect”,
arising from sub-optimal audience distribution between platforms (x∗1−xo1 = − 23 z). In
particular, if the quality differential of platform1 is positive, then its equilibriummarket
share is lower than it is at thefirst-best level. It is interesting to note that according to (1),
alleviating “audience distortion” implies a reduction in the advertising gap (a1−a2),10
whereas reducing “advertising distortion” involves a reduction in advertising levels.
In the following section we will investigate these two distortion effects in the case of
a mixed duopoly.
3 The mixed duopoly model
In this section, we will assume that platform 1 is a publicly owned firm that maximises
social welfare, whereas platform 2 is a private firm that maximises its profits. Substi-
tuting (1) in (6) and maximising the resulting welfare function with respect to a1, we
obtain the reaction function of publicly owned platform 1, which is as follows:
aBR1 (a2) = max
{
a2 + k − 1
δ(2k − 1) (v1 − v2 + t), 0
}
(8)
This function can be interpreted in terms of the two distortionary effects described
in the previous section. Note that if k = 1, then only the “audience distortion effect”
appears and the optimal advertising choice made by the platform implies the selection
of the same level of advertising as its competitor, which in this case, yields a first-best
solution. However, if k = 1, then the “advertising distortion effect” is also present
and the first-best solution cannot be achieved in equilibrium, as will be shown in
this section. In particular, if k < 1, advertising is harmful and the publicly owned
platform faces a trade-off between two objectives: reducing the “audience distortion
effect” implies a reduction in the advertising gap ( a1 − a2) but the need to alleviate
“advertising distortion” suggests a reduction in advertising to a level below that of the
rival.
Note that platform 2’s reaction function is the same as that in the previous section
because it continues to be a private firm.
In the following analysis, we will maintain the following
Assumption 1 k > 1/2 and z ∈ (−1, 1).
The condition k > 1/2 is necessary to ensure the second order condition for welfare
maximization by platform 1, whereas z ∈ (−1, 1) is needed for positive market shares
10 To understand this result, recall that xo1 = v1−v2+t2t , which, combined with (1), implies that x1 − xo1 =
δ(a1−a2)
2t . This inference is drawn because when the advertising differential is zero, each viewer chooses
his/her most preferred program, which is optimal, but with a positive or negative advertising differential,
viewers tend to shift towards the platform with a lower level of advertising.
123
SERIEs (2014) 5:105–124 113
for both platforms in themixed duopoly.11 The following lemma collects the NE levels
for the main endogenous variables in this section.
Lemma 1 Under Assumption 1, both firms are active in the mixed duopoly and the
NE values for advertising, market shares, and profits are as follows:
Case (a): z < 4k − 3 :
a′1 =
(4k − 3)t − (v1 − v2)
δ(2k − 1) ; a
′
2 =
(3k − 2)t − k(v1 − v2)
δ(2k − 1) ;
a′ = a′1 + a′2 =
(7k − 5)t − (k + 1)(v1 − v2)
δ(2k − 1) ;
x ′1 =
k(v1 − v2 + t)
2(2k − 1)t ; x
′
2 =
(3k − 2)t − k(v1 − v2)
2(2k − 1)t ;
π ′1 =
k2[(4k − 3)t − (v1 − v2)](v1 − v2 + t)
2(2k − 1)2t ;
π ′2 =
k[(3k − 2)t − k(v1 − v2)]2
2(2k − 1)2t . (9)
Case (b): z ≥ 4k − 3 :
a′1 = 0; a′2 =
(v2 − v1 + t)
2δ
;
a′ = a′1 + a′2 =
(v2 − v1 + t)
2δ
;
x ′1 =
(v1 − v2 + 3t)
4t
; x ′2 =
v2 − v1 + t
4t
;
π ′1 = 0;
π ′2 =
(v2 − v1 + t)2
8δt
. (10)
Proof See Appendix. unionsq
As previously explained, note that both the “audience distortion effect” and the
“advertising distortion effect” arise in equilibrium. In particular, if z < 4k − 3 and
k < 1, then the audience distortion effect is determined by x ′1 − xo1 = (k−1)(z+1)2(2k−1) ,
which means that the NE audience of platform 1 is too small, compared with the first
best. Obviously, because a′1 > 0, and a′2 > 0, advertising levels at the NE are too
large, from the social welfare perspective.
As in the private duopoly, platform 2 establishes more ads and obtains a larger
audience when its quality increases. However, publicly owned platform 1 operates in
contrast to a private platform, as observed in the following proposition.
11 Under the mixed duopoly regime, it can be shown that if z ≥ 1, only the private platform is active,
whereas if z ≤ −1, only the publicly owned platform is active. Also, note that Assumption 1 ensures
positive market shares for both firms in the private duopoly (see expressions in (4)).
123
114 SERIEs (2014) 5:105–124
Proposition 3 In the case of competition between a publicly owned platform and a
private platform, the advertising levels of both platforms decrease with the quality
differential (v1 − v2) of the publicly owned platform.
Proof See Appendix. unionsq
Note that if advertising is harmful (k < 1), the reaction functions of both firms shift
downwards as the quality differential increases, which obviously implies a reduction in
both advertising levels. Intuitively, if the quality differential is large, platform 1’s audi-
ence is very large and it has great interest in reducing its level of harmful advertising.
Interestingly, the previous proposition holds even if advertising is socially desirable
(k > 1). The intuition behind this result can be explained by considering two effects
associated with an increase in the quality differential (v1 − v2) when k > 1: On the
one hand, as shown in expression (8), the public firm tends to increase its advertising
level because the social desirability of advertising increases with its audience, but
on the other hand, the private platform tends to reduce its advertising because of the
increased quality of its rival. However, the second effect (which is negative) prevails
over the first one (which is positive) because the public channel’s best-reply function
(8) is steeper than that corresponding to the private one (3). Intuitively, the publicly
owned platform is more sensitive to its rival’s advertising because it tends to adjust its
advertising level to find an optimal distribution of audiences between both platforms.
Surprisingly, in the current debate on the optimal level of advertising in the broad-
casting industry, the quality levels of the programmes offered tend to be ignored.
However, as our previous proposition illuminates, this debate is meaningless with-
out consideration of the crucial role of the quality differential between the publicly
owned and private platforms. In particular, our result suggests that rather than direct
intervention in advertising regulation, a decrease in advertising levels in the broadcast-
ing industry can be achieved through improvement in the quality of the programmes
offered by the publicly owned platform.12
Using (4), (9) and (10), the following result holds with regard to market shares:
Proposition 4 The market share of platform 1 at the NE of both the private and mixed
duopoly increases with the quality differential v1 − v2, but market share’s sensitivity
to this quality differential is greater in the mixed duopoly than in the private one.
Proof See Appendix. unionsq
Intuitively, a larger quality differential tends to render a larger market share of the
high-quality platform socially desirable. This effect is better captured by the publicly
owned platform because the private platform is interested in increasing its advertising
revenues, which tends to decrease its market share.
As explained in the Appendix, using (9) and (10), straightforward calculations
provides the following result, illustrated in the (k, z) space in Fig. 1.
Proposition 5 At the NE of the mixed duopoly in which both platforms are active, the
following properties hold:
12 See González-Maestre and Martínez-Sánchez (2012) for the analysis of a broadcasting duopoly and the
endogenous choice of platform quality.
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Fig. 1 Advertising comparisons in the mixed duopoly
i) If advertising is socially desirable (k > 1), then the publicly owned platform
undertakes more advertising than the private platform.(See region (I)).
ii) If advertising is socially harmful (k < 1), then the publicly owned platform
undertakes less advertising than the private platform. (See regions (II) and (III)).
iii) Moreover, if advertising is socially harmful and the quality differential of the
public platform is sufficiently large relative to social preferences for advertising
(z ≥ h(k) = 4k − 3), then the NE of the mixed duopoly implies an “advertising-
free” publicly owned platform. (See region (III))
Proof See Appendix. unionsq
The previous result is explained by the two effects that advertising exerts onwelfare:
On the one hand, advertising has a direct effect, captured by k , which depends on
the private profits associated with advertising (measured by γ ) and the nuisance costs
(measured by δ), but on the other hand, advertising also has an indirect effect onwelfare
by affecting the distribution of audience shares between the two platforms. Obviously,
because of the direct effect, the publicly owned platform undertakes a greater level of
advertising than the private platform if and only if advertising is socially profitable
(region I). However, note that the interplay between the direct and indirect effect
explains why advertising by the publicly owned platform is positive in region (II),
despite the harmful direct effect in this region. This interplay is positive because the
negative direct impact exerted by advertising on welfare is outweighed by the positive
effect associated with the fact the publicly owned platform’s advertising increases
the size of the private platform audience, which is socially profitable if the quality
differential of the publicly owned platform is small (compared with k).
Interestingly, region (III) facilitates the identification of the cases in which an
“advertising-free” public platform is actually an optimal decision (in terms of a NE
of the game). Intuitively, for this result to hold, advertising must have a direct harmful
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effect (k < 1), but in addition, region (III) requires the quality differential of the pub-
licly owned platform to be sufficiently large. Thus, a policy implication of our model
is that the case for an “advertising-free” publicly owned platform implies that the pub-
licly owned platform has sufficiently high quality compared with its rival. Otherwise,
the recent policies mentioned in the introduction that are used by some EU countries
would not necessarily be welfare-enhancing even if advertising has a direct harmful
effect.
4 Private versus mixed duopoly
We are mainly interested in determining which setting, a private or mixed duopoly,
is better from a social perspective. However, to aid the understanding of the basic
intuition behind the welfare comparisons between the regimes, it is useful to consider
the comparison between the NE advertising levels in each of the previous models.
Easy computations indicate the following:
Proposition 6 The individual and total advertising levels in the mixed duopoly are
greater (respectively lower) than they are in the private duopoly if and only if z is
below (and, respectively, above) the function f (k) ≡ 3(k−1)k+1 . Formally,
a′i  a∗i ↔ z  f (k) ≡
3(k − 1)
k + 1 ; i = 1, 2.
Proof See Appendix. unionsq
Proposition 6 is reflected in Fig. 2, in which there are two relevant regions: In the
region above the function z = f (k), advertising levels under the mixed duopoly are
smaller than they are under the private duopoly, and the opposite property holds in
the region below f (k). The intuition behind Proposition 6 is as follows: a publicly
owned platform’s incentive to undertake advertising decreases with both the nuisance
cost (which is inversely related to k ≡ γ /δ) and the quality differential z. As a
1
-1
0.5
-0.5
0
1.5
20.75 1 1.25 1.5 1.750.5
z
k
(k)f
*
i ia a'
*
i ia a'
Fig. 2 Advertising comparisons between mixed and private duopoly
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result, the larger k and the smaller z are, the more likely it is that the market is in
the region where the mixed duopoly involves more advertising (note that the function
z = f (k) is strictly increasing). In our subsequent analysis, we will observe that the
welfare comparisons between the two models are very closely related to the previous
advertising comparisons.
As in Sect. 2, we calculate social welfare in themixed duopoly, which is represented
by the expression (6). Thus, considering the equilibrium value of advertising and
market share in (9) and (10) and using z ≡ (v1 − v2)/t , we determine the social
welfare in each case:
Case (a): z < 4k − 3:
W ′ = t 4(k − 1)[(3k − 2) − kz] + k
2(z + 1)2
4(2k − 1) + v2 −
t
2
. (11)
Case (b): z ≥ 4k − 3:
W ′ = t 8(k − 1)(1 − z)) + [(1 + 2k)z + (1 − k)](z + 3)
16
+ v2 − t
2
. (12)
We now calculate the difference in social welfare between the private and themixed
duopoly for each of the cases collected in Lemma 1:
Case (a): z < 4k − 3:
W ′ − W ∗
t
= 45(k − 1)
2 − 18(k2 − 1)z + (k + 1)2z2
36(2k − 1) . (13)
Case (b): z ≥ 4k − 3:
W ′ − W ∗
t
= 1
144
(z + 3)(5z − 42k + 2kz + 39) (14)
As explained in the Appendix, we find that the socially optimal setting depends on
the interplay between parameters z and k, as illustrated in the following proposition
and in Fig. 3.
Proposition 7 For the private duopoly to be socially preferred to a mixed duopoly
we require either (i) the combination of socially harmful advertising (k < 1) and a
negative quality differential (region D) or (ii) the combination of socially beneficial
advertising (k > 1) and a positive quality differential (region B). In addition, any of
the following conditions ensures that the mixed duopoly will be socially preferred to
a private duopoly: (iii) socially harmful advertising, combined with a positive quality
differential (region A) or (iv) socially beneficial advertising, combined with a low
quality differential (region C).
Proof See Appendix. unionsq
Note that under the assumption (the most common in the previous literature) that
platformsprovide the samequality but different content (only horizontal differentiation
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exists), the difference in social welfare between the private and the mixed duopoly
(see Eqs. (13), (14)) is reduced to the following expression:
W ′ − W ∗
t
=
{
3(39−42k)
144 if k ≤ 34
5(k−1)2
4(2k−1) if k >
3
4 ,
(15)
which is positive because we assume that k > 1/2. Therefore, when platforms are only
horizontally differentiated, a publicly owned platformmust exist. However, according
to our results, this case is a very particular one, and the optimal government intervention
in the broadcasting industry has a crucial dependence on on the interactions between
the quality differential of platforms and the relationship between the social value of
advertising and nuisance cost.13
To understand the intuition behind Proposition 7, let us combine this result with the
following facts, which are easily obtained: First, in the private duopoly a∗1  a∗2 ↔
v1  v2 and second, in the mixed duopoly a′1  a′2 ↔ k  1. Considering these facts
and the previous proposition, the following result holds:
Corollary 1 The regions represented in Fig. 3 are characterised as follows: In regions
A and C, the socially optimal market is a mixed duopoly, whereas in regions B and
D, the socially optimal market is a private duopoly. Moreover, in regions A and B,
the mixed duopoly undertakes less advertising than the private duopoly, whereas in
regions C and D, it undertakes more.
The intuition behind the previous corollary is as follows:
13 Note that in the other particular case k = 1, Fig. 3 shows that a mixed duopoly is socially better than a
private duopoly. Formally, this particular case resembles the result obtained by Ishibashi and Kaneko (2008)
in the reinterpretation of the price levels in their model as the advertising levels in our model. However,
our formulation is more general because k can be different from one, which implies that privatisation is not
always better than a mixed duopoly, and we consider a straightforward model of two-sided markets.
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i) In regions B and D, the optimal governmental strategy is to choose a private
duopoly, but the underlying explanation is different. In region B, a publicly owned
platform undertakes a lower level of advertising than a private firm. Intuitively,
in this region, advertising is socially profitable (k is large) and the government
chooses the market structure with a higher level of advertising. However, in region
D, advertising is socially harmful (k is small) and a mixed duopoly undertakes
more advertising than a private one. Thus, privatisation is the optimal policy.
ii) In regions A and C, the optimal governmental strategy is a mixed duopoly, but
again, for different reasons. Essentially, in region A, the government chooses a
mixed duopoly because it yields less advertising than the private duopoly and
advertising is relatively harmful. However, in region C, the government chooses
a mixed duopoly because it yields more advertising than the private duopoly and
advertising is relatively beneficial.
Note that according to Corollary 1 and Fig. 3, the frontier between regions A and
D is the same as that separating regions B and C, which in turn, is the same as the
frontier that separates the regions determining the sign of the advertising comparisons
in Fig. 2. Therefore, the intuition behind welfare comparisons is closely related to the
intuition behind advertising comparisons, as previously explained.
It is interesting to examine cases D and B in terms of the taxonomy developed by
Fundenberg and Tirole (1984). In case D, the optimal governmental choice can be
interpreted as an example of the so-called “Lean and Hungry Look”: By choosing a
private duopoly, the government makes a credible commitment to “underinvest” in
advertising (which hurts its rival). However, in case B, the same privatisation strategy
is an example of the so-called “Fat Cat” effect: The government chooses a private
duopoly as a commitment to “overinvest” in advertising (which is beneficial to its
rival).
Therefore, one interesting insight in our analysis is that intervention with a publicly
owned channel need not be optimal even when private broadcasters have no compara-
tive advantage in running the business (region B in Fig. 3). This result hinges upon the
assumption that the publicly owned broadcaster cannot credibly commit to an advertis-
ing level. If the broadcaster could, then it would always be able to replicate the private
duopoly outcome by simply choosing what a profit-oriented firm would. That is, if we
assume that the publicly owned platform acts as Stackelberg’s leader in terms of the
advertising choice, then privatisation will never be optimal. However, the credibility
of the publicly owned firm’s commitment to a given level of advertising cannot be
taken for granted. In principle, this commitment could be implemented through the
use of a long-run contract between the public channel and the advertisers, but there
is not a clear reason for why this instrument cannot also be available for the private
platform. In consequence, it appears that our assumption of simultaneous advertising
choices is reasonable.
5 Conclusions and final comments
In this study, we develop a model in which a publicly owned platform competes
with a private one in a free-to-air broadcasting industry in which programmes are
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differentiated in two dimensions: content (horizontal differentiation) and quality (ver-
tical differentiation). In this context, we consider the publicly owned firm’s optimal
level of advertising and identify the conditions under which the recently adopted pol-
icy of an “advertising-free” publicly owned platform is actually an optimal choice
from the social welfare perspective.
We also analyse the social profitability of the presence of a publicly owned platform
and show that the optimal government intervention in the broadcasting industry has
a crucial dependence on the interactions between the quality differential of platforms
and the relationship between the social value of advertising and nuisance cost. In
particular, we find that the existence of a publicly owned platform can be a social
optimum even if it provides lower quality than the private platform. However, we
also identify conditions under which a private duopoly is socially better than a mixed
duopoly even if the publicly owned platform provides higher quality than its private
competitor.
Our results are limited by our assumptions. In particular, we ignore the possibil-
ity that platforms will make an endogenous choice of quality, which in turn, would
imply the presence of endogenous fixed costs. In fact, this issue is developed in a
related paper by González-Maestre and Martínez-Sánchez (2012), where qualities are
endogenous. The obvious question is the following: which scenario is more relevant,
from the economic policy perspective? In our view, the answer to this question depends
on several considerations with regard to the institutional framework determining the
timing of decisions. In particular, it appears that both the investment associated with
platforms’ quality choices and the decision regarding the privatisation of the publicly
owned platform are long-run choices, but it is not clear which of the two types of
choices is more flexible. Therefore, we believe that the analysis of the two scenarios
is meaningful.
Some of the results obtained in our model yield similar insights. In particular, it is
shown in González-Maestre and Martínez-Sánchez (2012) that the greater the degree
of horizontal product differentiation, themore likely is that amixed duopoly is socially
optimal. A similar result is implicit in our Fig. 3. According to this figure, for any given
level of quality differential, a greater degree of horizontal product differentiationmakes
it more likely that a mixed duopoly is optimal. However, there are some remarkable
differences in terms of results and policy implications between the two approaches:
1) Under endogenous qualities, González-Maestre and Martínez-Sánchez (2012)
show that a mixed duopoly is socially better than privatisation only if the direct
effect of advertising is either very harmful or highly beneficial, whereas privati-
sation is the optimal policy if advertising is neutral or has a moderate effects on
welfare. In contrast, under exogenous qualities we have shown that the mixed
duopoly is socially better than privatisation if advertising is neutral.
2) In our model with exogenous qualities, the case for an “advertising-free” publicly
owned platform is associated to socially harmful advertising, whereas in themodel
of endogenous qualities, González-Maestre and Martínez-Sánchez (2012) obtain
caseswhere an “advertising-free” publicly ownedplatform is optimal even if adver-
tising is socially beneficial. Therefore, the policy implications with respect to the
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advertising regulation in the public platform are substantially different between
both scenarios.
There are obviously many relevant issues, related to the advertising market that have
not been considered in our model. As explained in Sect. 2, our model relies on the
assumption known as competitive bottleneck (Armstrong 2006), which involves con-
stant revenue per ad per viewer (parameter γ , in our model). This assumption is a
standard one in the literature on two-sided markets. A more complex modeling of
the advertising market would consider γ as an endogenous variable that depends
on platforms’ competition to attract advertisers. This alternative assumption would
complicate the analysis. However, under reasonable conditions, our qualitative con-
clusions would still hold. For instance, it could be assumed that γ is determined by
means of an efficient bargaining process between the advertiser and its associated
platform in which the bargaining power of each platform is inversely related to the
amount of advertising offered by the rival platform, and that in turn, this bargaining
power determines the share of profits obtained by each part. Note that allowing γ to be
endogenous in this way will affect only the distribution of profits between the platform
and advertisers, not the platforms’ decisions regarding advertising level or the welfare
analysis.14 In our simplified model, we have also assumed zero costs. Note that with a
positive fixed cost, public television will be unable to survive without advertisements
unless it receives a transfer from the government. Our implicit assumption is that this
transfer is obtained through non-distortionary taxation, but if this were not the case,
then the welfare analysis would have to consider the distortion.
The model could also be extended to investigate the combined role of a publicly
owned firm and other policy tools. In particular, some European countries establish
caps on the number of advertisements. In principle, the availability of this tool could
change our results regarding the role of public television. However, as explained in
the introduction, the combined effects of lobbying, technological change, and global-
isation make it increasingly difficult to implement this tool optimally, which tends to
reinforce the role of public television, as noted by Kind et al. (2007).
Lastly, our analysis focuses on a particular economic aspect of broadcasting mar-
kets and abstracts from other economic and institutional issues. In particular, we have
assumed that the only aim of the public intervention in broadcastingmarkets is tomax-
imise total welfare and that this welfare depends on viewers’ valuation of programme
quality.15 However, it is rather obvious that in practice, there are other plausible objec-
tives justifying the presence of a publicly owned platform, including the provision of
“universal contents”, cultural and educational diffusion, political reasons, and many
14 As noted by a referee, the competition between public and private televisions to attract announcers is a
relevant issue in themarket place,whichmight explain the interest of private television in the recent decisions
of some European public television platforms to eliminate advertising. However, the recent empirical work
by Filistrucchi et al. (2012) on the effects of the advertising ban on French public television appears to
indicate that the common expectation that the ban would favour private TV channels has not been confirmed
in practice.
15 Another interesting extension of the model could consider a generalised welfare objective for which
consumer surplus and platforms’ profits have different valuation in the objective function of the publicly
owned firm. In particular, if the public TV overvaluates viewer utility, then it will tend to reduce advertising,
which makes it more likely an equilibrium with “advertising-free” public TV.
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others. In particular, our results could change substantially if the regulator’s valuation
of programme quality differs from the viewers’, which could be justified by political
or cultural objectives.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License
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6 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1 According to (4),
∂a∗i
∂(vi −v j ) = 13δ > 0,
∂x∗i
∂(vi −v j ) = 16t > 0 and
∂π∗i
∂(vi −v j ) =
k(vi −v j +3t)
9t > 0, which is ensured by x
∗
i ≥ 0.
Proof of Proposition 2 From (4), it follows that
∂π∗i
∂t = k(vi −v j +3t)(v j −vi +3t)18t2 > 0,
which is ensured by x∗i ≥ 0. In addition, ∂π
∗
i
∂k = (vi −v j +3t)
2
18t2
> 0 (recall that k = γ /δ).
Proof of Lemma 1 Using (3) and (8), we can calculate the NE levels of advertising in
expressions (9) and (10), which, substituted in (1) and (2), yield the NE market shares
and profits collected in (9) and (10), respectively.
To observe that market shares are positive for both firms, note that combining
Assumption 1 with (9) and (10) ensures that x ′1 > 0. Now, let us consider the value of
x ′2. If k ≥ 1 then according to Assumption 1, case (a) holds, and using (9), we have
x ′2 > 0 ←→ z < 3 − 2k , which is ensured by Assumption 1. If k < 1 and case (a)
hold, then x ′2 > 0 ←→ z < 3 − 2k , which is ensured by the condition z < 4k − 3,
which defines case (a). To obtain this result, note that if k < 1 then 3 − 2k < 4k − 3,
which completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3 According to (9), we have that in case (a),
∂a′1
∂(v1−v2) =
− 1
δ(2k−1) < 0 and
∂a′2
∂(v1−v2) = − kδ(2k−1) < 0, which is ensured by Assumption 1.
In case (b) we have
∂a′2
∂(v1−v2) = − 12δ < 0.
Proof of Proposition 4 Case (a): Using (4) and (9), we obtain
∂x∗1
∂(v1−v2) = 16t <
∂x ′1
∂(v1−v2) = k2(2k−1)t , which is ensured by k > 1/2. Case (b): Using (4) and (10),
we determine that
∂x∗1
∂(v1−v2) = 16t <
∂x ′1
∂(v1−v2) = 14t .
Proof of Proposition 5 Recall that according to Lemma 1, both platforms are active
under Assumption 1, which includes regions (I), (II) and (III) in Fig. 1. Note that
according to cases (a) and (b), shown in expressions (9) and (10), the frontier between
regions (II) and (III) is determined by the equation z = 4k − 3. At the RHS of
this equation, which includes regions (I) and (II), expressions at (9) are the relevant
ones for the advertising levels. By using these expressions, we determine that a′1 
a′2 ←→ k  1, which proves parts (i) and (ii). Part (iii) originates from the fact that
a′1 > 0 ←→ z < 4k − 3, which implies that in region (III), we have a′1 = 0.
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Proof of Proposition 6 By using (4), (9), and (10), it follows that a′i > a∗i ←→ a′ >
a∗ ←→ z < 3(k−1)k+1 .
Proof of Proposition 7 Case (a): Given that k > 1/2 and t > 0, the sign of the
difference in social welfare is the same as the sign of the numerator of expression
(13). By using the condition W
′−W ∗
t = 0, we obtain the following pair of solutions:
z = f (k) = 3(k − 1)
k + 1 ; z = g(k) =
15(k − 1)
k + 1
From these two functions, shown in Fig. 3, it is easy to obtain the sign of W
′−W ∗
t in
each of the four regions illustrated in Fig. 3 (B, C, D, and the part of region A that is
consistent with this case).
Case (b): By using (14), it follows that the sign of W
′−W ∗
t is provided by 5z −42k +
2kz + 39, which is strictly positive in this case. To obtain this result, note first that
5z −42k +2kz +39 > 0 ↔ z > l(k) ≡ 12k+5 (42k −39), and second, that in our case
z > h(k) ≡ 4k − 3 > l(k) ≡ 12k+5 (42k − 39), the last inequality being satisfied for
the range of values established in Assumption 1. Therefore, W
′−W ∗
t > 0 in the part of
region A that is consistent with this case.
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